A Dubious Expediency by Gail Heriot

A Dubious Expediency by Gail Heriot

Author:Gail Heriot
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Encounter Books
Published: 2021-05-15


STRICT SCRUTINY AND DEFERENCE: A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS


Grutter was one of those 5–4 decisions that the modern Court has become famous for. The one thing that all nine members agreed on was that the law school’s policy was racially discriminatory and therefore had to be subjected to “strict scrutiny.” Strict scrutiny is the law of equal protection’s most demanding standard: A racially discriminatory law or policy can be upheld only if the Court finds the justification for it “compelling” and further finds that the law or policy at issue is “narrowly tailored” to achieve that compelling justification. Prior to Grutter, it was rare for anything subjected to strict scrutiny to survive it. Indeed, in 1972, leading constitutional scholar Gerald Gunther referred to the standard as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”7

But, in Grutter, the Court’s majority immediately eviscerated the high standard it had set. It held that it should “defer” to the law school’s “educational judgment” in determining whether its stated purpose—the desire to capture the educational benefits of diversity for all its students—was compelling.8

By purporting to “defer,” the Court turned strict scrutiny on its head. Deference is the opposite of strict scrutiny. One cannot strictly scrutinize a government’s actions and defer to its judgment at the same time. To do so is to contradict oneself.

The Court sought to justify itself by referring to “academic freedom.” But there is no chance whatsoever that academic freedom would have been sufficient to justify any other form of race discrimination. Imagine if the Supreme Court had deferred in the landmark Civil Rights Era cases dealing with education—Sweatt v. Painter (1950),9 McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (1950),10 and Brown v. Board of Education (1954).11 At the time, there was no shortage of education experts that the defendants could produce as expert witnesses who believed—perhaps sincerely—that students learn better in racially segregated schools.12 The nation should be thankful the Court had the courage to exercise its own judgment.

Why then should higher education be given deference now? The Court never fully explained why, alone among government instrumentalities, public colleges and universities should be exempt from the strong presumption against racially discriminatory laws and policies (or why, alone among industries, private colleges and universities should be exempt). The answer cannot be expertise, since it is always the case that the defendant in an equal protection case will have greater expertise than the Court has concerning its own business. With four law professors and nine lawyers on the Court, there was much less reason to defer in Grutter about matters of legal education than there would have been in a case about mail delivery or nuclear power. It also cannot be because colleges and universities have a particularly commendable history of racial equity. Quite the opposite is the case. Discrimination against African Americans at both public and private institutions of higher learning, including many north of the Mason-Dixon line, is a story that should require no elaboration here. Jewish quotas are another blot on higher education’s history, particularly at Ivy League and other selective schools.



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